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The goal of this paper is to incorporate achievements of the New Institutional and Transaction 
Costs Economics to analysis of efficiency of agrarian organizations in transitional economies. That 
modern framework for analysis of agrarian organizations is based on their role to govern transactions 
between individual agents. Since governing (coordination, organization) of transactions is associated 
with significant costs (for finding best prices and partners, for negotiation and contracting, for 
monitoring and enforcement of contract terms, for adjustment and re-negotiation according to changed 
conditions of exchange, for dispute resolutions etc.), the economic efficiency of agrarian organizations 
has to assess not only their capacity to minimize the production costs, but their potential to economize 
transacting costs as well.  
Initially, main kinds of transactions of the managers of agrarian transactions (farms 
entrepreneurs) are clarified as land, labor, service, inputs, and finance supply; marketing; and collective 
actions. After that, the alternative market, non-market, and mixed modes for organization of different 
types of agrarian transitions are identified. Next, various types of costs associated with each form of 
transacting are determined. And then, the comparative efficiency of different governance structures is 
estimated according to (minimum) transacting costs criteria.  
One direction for evaluation of comparative efficiency of governing structures is based on direct 
assessment of items of costs for transaction in different organizations. However, that manner is often 
restricted since: difficulties (or impossibility) to measure absolute level of transaction costs; opposite 
dynamics of different items of costs in various organizations; great use of complex (and interlinked) 
rather than pure modes in transitional agriculture; and not existence (missing) of alternative form for 
organization (the base for comparison). 
Another direction is through comparative structural (qualitative) analysis of alternative governing 
forms. Firstly, critical factors of transactions in particular institutional environment are identified. These 
factors affect transaction costs variation, and they are associated: with behavioral characteristic of 
agrarian agents (bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism, building of reputation, risk aversion, 
level of trusts); and with economic dimensions of individual transactions (frequency, uncertainty, assets 
specificity and appropriability).  
Secondly, assessment is made on effective potential of alternative organizational modes to: 
minimize bounded rationality of agrarian agents and uncertainty associated with transacting; to 
appropriate and protect private investments from possible opportunism; to recover long-term 
investments for organizational development through high recurrence of transactions between same 
agents; to exploit economy of size and scale on specific for relationship with a particular partner capital 
etc.  
Third, principal matrix of generic organizational modes is build for effective governance of 
transactions with different combination of critical dimensions: free market mode if effective to carry out 
transactions with high appropriability and low assets specificity; the special contract form is appropriate 
for transactions with high frequency, and increased uncertainty and assets specificity; the internal 
integration can manage effectively repeated transactions with high capital dependency and big 
uncertainty; the hybrid and public modes are the most effective forms for occasional transactions with 
low appropriability and high assets specificity. 
Finally, effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of every specific form within each generic 
modes could be determined through comparison of their potential to explore economy of size (scale) on   2
specific or (and) specialized assets, and their comparative efficiency to minimize bounded rationality 
and to control opportunism of counterparts.     
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Problems associated with criteria and approaches for evaluation of efficiency of agrarian 
structures and organizations have been among the most debated in economic theory and 
business practices. Than has been especially topical issues since the beginning of transition in 
Eastern European countries. During the course of fundamental reforms the question of 
efficiency has been often "politicized" as unilateral priority has been given to a particular type 
of economic organization - free market, private farming, family farm, cooperative, etc. 
In recent years some profound analyses of efficiency of different farm structures have 
also appeared (Kaneva). They are mostly based on estimates of productivity of resources use in 
various types of organizations. At the same time, these publications do not give answer to the 
fundamental question: why twelve years after beginning of transformation there are still 
widespreading "inefficient" organizations - unproductive self-sufficient farms, production 
cooperatives with profitability several times lower than in market oriented private farms etc
1. 
New Institutional (Transaction Cost) Economics is a new developing methodology which 
tries to explain the economic reason for existence and efficiency of economic organizations 
with their role to minimize transaction costs (Furuboth and Richter, Williamson). Following 
this new logic transitional farms, agro-firms, various contractual, organizational and market 
modes, all they have been considered as alternative governance, rather than production, 
structures for relationships (transacting) between different agrarian agents (Bachev and Tsuji 
2001a).  
The goal of this paper is to incorporate achievements of that new developing concept into 
analysis of efficiency of agrarian organizations. This paper is only a first attempt to work out a 
modern framework for evaluation of different governing structures in transitional agriculture. It 
aims to put grounds rather than complete the approach for adequate analysis of agrarian 
governance modes. Without development of a modern approach for understanding and 
assessment of efficiency we can neither analyze comparative efficiency of agrarian 
organizations nor to design appropriate policies for its improvement. 
 
The traditional approach 
 
Broadly applied traditional approach for evaluation of efficiency of economic 
organizations in farming is based only on assessment of efficiency of production costs and 
productivity of employed agrarian recourses. Accordingly, a great number of indicators are also 
used to express efficiency of organizations through determining the level of use of factors 
(land, labor, capital), rate of return (pay-back, profitability) of current and long-term 
expenditures etc.  
                                                           
1 Some estimates show that rate of profitability of Bulgarian cooperatives is 5 times lower than in 
private farms - namely 4.7% against 26.5% in surveyed non cooperative farms (Kaneva p.95).   3
In more sophisticated models of traditional (Neoclassical) economy criteria for 
assessment of efficiency of organization is derived from the equilibrium condition of entire 
economic system - when marginal benefits are equalized with marginal costs
2. These 
organizations which use recourses with different (higher or lower) from the marginal 
productivity are inefficient. For instance, if a farm has a higher productivity than the social 
level (since it is employing resources more effectively than other organizations) but it does not 
further invest additional resources to explore the effective internal potential - then it is 
inefficient. Contrary, if a farm is performing with lower (than the social) productivity, it means 
that it integrates more recourses than it can effectively manage (and which could be more 
effectively used in other organizations), and therefore it is inefficient. 
However, the traditional approach for evaluation of economic organizations can not give 
an answer to the question: why there exist so many organizations with different productivity of 
resources utilization. If efficiency of a particular organization in low, there will always be a 
strong private incentive or social mechanism (competition, central planning) for reallocation of 
resources to more effective application - optimization, specialization, extension, or liquidation 
of the organization. In a foreseeable long run (say 5-10 years) there will exist only "effective" 
organizations, which govern resources on (or close to) the socially acceptable level of 
efficiency. 
Besides, the traditional approach estimates and compares the efficiency level in different 
organizations without even looking for an answer to the question: why there exist so big variety 
of types of economic organizations in agriculture (one-person farms, group farms, registered 
cooperatives and affirms of different kind, join ventures, self-sufficient farms, small and large 
farms etc.). 
Therefore, within the narrow framework of the traditional approach, restricting efficiency 
of economic organizations to production costs, it can neither be understood the economic 
reason for existence of different types of agrarian organizations nor to be evaluated their 
comparative efficiencies. 
 
The new approach 
 
The new developing methodology of Transaction Cost Economics explains existence of 
different agrarian organizations in their role to govern transactions between individual agrarian 
agents (Bachev and Tsuji 2001a, Sporleder). Usually carrying out of individual transacting 
(land supply, labor supply, finance supply, marketing etc) is associated with significant 
transactions costs - for finding out the best prices and partners; for negotiation and 
renegotiations; for contract writing and registration; for enforcement of contacted terms; for 
resolution of disputes between parties including through a third party (e.g. court) involvement 
etc. Therefore, economic efficiency of agrarian organizations should take into account not only 
their capacity to minimize production costs, but also their ability to economize on transaction 
costs. In this regard Dahlman writes: "Indeed it is obvious that once there is shift from a 
                                                           
2 Such definition of efficiency (firstly formulated in the beginning of last century from Artour 
Pigou) today can be found in all textbooks in Economics. In that relation Eggertsson points out "It is a 
central characteristic of welfare economics that economic outcomes derived from the basic neoclassical 
model are used as a criterion of efficiency. Outcomes that deviate from outcomes in model based on fully 
defined exclusive rights (in property) and costless transactions are called "inefficient" (Eggertsson, p. 21). 
   4
"frictionless" universe scare resources have to be used to effect transactions, protect property 
rights and so on. This means in turn that the system’s total resource endowment can no longer 
be devoted solely to the production of normal commodities" (Dahlman, p.150). Moreover, both 
(current) costs for using of transacting forms and long-term costs for their development 
(organizational initiation, modernization, liquidation etc.) have to be taken into account 
(Bachev 2000, p.9). 
If execution of transactions was not associated with costs ("zero" transaction costs) then 
the mode of their organization would have no economic importance. Agrarian agents would 
manage their transactions with the same (equal) efficiency though free market (market prices 
movements), and through private organizations of different types (contracts, firms), and though 
collective decision making (cooperative, association), and in a nationwide hierarchy (single 
private or state company). Then technological opportunities for economies of scale and scope 
(maximum productivity of resources) would be easily achieved. All information for the 
effective potential of transactions (for optimization of utilization of resources, for satisfying 
new demands etc.) would be costlessly obtained by everybody, and individual agents would 
costlessly trade (exchange) available resources in their mutual benefit until exhausting the 
potential for increasing productivity (and reaching to the state of "equilibrium" in the 
Neoclassical economic model
3). 
However, very often the high transaction costs make difficult or even block otherwise 
efficient (mutually beneficial) for all parties transactions. For instance, despite of great pay-off 
of investments in agrarian research and innovation, market and private agents do not organize 
such transactions because of their high uncertainty and low (market and private) appropriability 
(Bachev and Labonne, p.12)
4.  
Since carrying out of individual transactions is connected with costs, the rational agrarian 
agents will seek, chose, and develop such modes for organization of their exchange of different 
kinds which minimize their costs of transacting. The type of organization is crucial since 
various governing structures give unequal possibilities for participants to coordinate and adapt 
transactions, to stimulate acceptable behavior of contragents, to control and protect their 
investments from unwanted expropriation etc. Therefore, in the long-run inefficient forms will 
be abandoned and only effective modes for organization of agrarian transaction will dominate.  
Each transaction has different specific dimensions which vary according to institutional 
environment (legislation, efficiency of public contract enforcement, other formal and informal 
restrictions), personal characteristics of participants (experience, built reputation, tendency for 
opportunistic behavior, level of risk taking), and macroeconomic conditions (stability, foreign 
trade regime etc.) (Furuboth and Richter, Williamson). Since there exist no a singe the most 
efficient (and thus universal) form for organization of all agrarian transactions, depending of 
critical dimensions of each transactions agrarian agents will use appropriate (most effective) 
                                                           
3 That situation is known as «Pareto optimum» or «Pareto efficiency». Then all social resources 
are allocated efficiently (they are managed by users who value them the most) and all mutually 
beneficial transactions are carried out (nobody could improve his or her welfare without reducing 
wellbeing of somebody else). 
4 That is true not only for transitional economies but for other countries as well. All estimates 
shows that both in developed and developing countries there has been a constant under-investment in 
agricultural research and innovation keeping rate of return much higher than traditional capital 
investments. High costs associated with transactions in that area restrict (block) their organization in an 
(socially) effective scale.    5
mode for its governing. Hence, in any particular moment agrarian activities will be carried out 
(governed) through a great variety of organizational structures: some agrarian transactions will 
take place in market (governed by "invisible hand of market"), some of them will be carried out 
through a special contract mode, some of them will be managed within an hierarchy (under 
"visible hand of the manager"), some of them will be supported by a third party (Government, 
NGO`s, international assistance), some of them would require more complicated and mixed 
modes etc. (Bachev 2000, p. 4).  
Therefore, it must be abandoned commonly used approach for evaluation of different 
form as "good" or "bad" for their own or in comparison with some no existed ideal (without 
transaction costs). Weakness of such approach has been strongly criticized by Demsetz: "The 
view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice 
as between an ideal norm and an existing "imperfect" institutional arrangement. This nirvana 
approach differs considerably from comparative institution approach in which the relevant 
choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements. In practice, those who adopt the 
nirvana viewpoint seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal and the real, and if 
discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient. Users of the comparative 
institution approach attempt to asses which alternative real institutional arrangement seems best 
able to cope with the economic problem" (Demsetz, p.1). 
Evaluation is to be directed to finding out of comparative advantages for initiating, 
establishing, and using; for management, adaptation, intensification, coordination, stimulation 
and controlling (in short - for minimization of overall costs) of transactions, of alternative (and 
really possible) in specific institutional environment modes for organization of different 
transactions. For instance, in the condition of not entirely restituted private rights on 
agricultural land, and the high costs for their exchange and protection, the short-term lease and 
the internal integration (self-consistent farming, production cooperation) have been the most-
efficient forms for organization of land supply in transitional Bulgarian agriculture (Bachev 
and Tsuji 2001b, p. 125).  
Therefore, evaluation of efficiency of agrarian organizations has to include not only 
comparative "productivity" of resources, but analyses of the level and structure of comparative 
transacting costs. Besides, such analyses should identify factors of transaction costs in 
nationwide (social) scale, which eventually slow down sustainable growth of agriculture, and 
lead to insufficient and unsustainable use of resources, underinvestment and low productivity 
in production, wide-spreading of primitive technologies, lack of innovations etc. When a high 
level of costs for market and private transactions (which prevent or entirely block development 
of market and private forms) is observed then either a public intervention in agrarian 
transactions (through assistance, regulation, hybrid or public organization) or fundamental 
institutional modernization (e.g. introduction and enforcement of new private rights) should be 
undertaken. However, such public intervention in agrarian sphere is to be initiated only if there 
is a net benefit - when effects (total economized costs) are greater than overall additional costs 
(individual and social) for the third-party involvement.   
 
Transaction the basic unit of analyses 
 
The new approach for analysis of agrarian organizations turns individual transaction and 
costs associated with transaction in the center of economic analysis (Bachev and Tsuji 2001a, 
Williamson). Following that new approach firstly, we have to determined major type of   6
transactions in which agents managing agrarian transactions (the farm entrepreneurs) 
participates. Secondly, we are to identify possible alternative forms for organization of diverse 
type of transacting. Next, we should specify various kinds of (transaction) costs associated with 
different type of transacting. Finally, we are to assess comparative efficiency of alternative 
governing structures according to the criteria (minimum) transaction costs. 
Main types of transactions of the farm entrepreneur are associated with the supply of 
different "factors" of production and with marketing of farm output. Actually the farm manager 
manages not (production) technology but transactions related with production. It is not a 
hypothetical case when an entrepreneur is entirely engaged in managing transactions rather 
than participating in production activity - e.g. when he hires all labor and production managers 
for carrying out technological operations, and spends all his time for governing of contractual 
relations (finding partners, negotiation and re-negotiation, contract writing, monitoring, 
enforcement, disputing etc.). Thus, in general we can identify following major types of 
transactions in farming: linked with labor supply, land supply, finance supply, service supply, 
inputs supply, knowledge supply, innovation supply, and realization (marketing) of output. 
Besides, the farms entrepreneur takes part in a great variety of transactions ("collective 
actions") for inducing public (Government, local authority, international etc.) intervention in 
market and private transactions in his own interests (Bachev 2000, p.7). 
For each transaction there is a big diversity of practically possible (and therefore 
alternative) forms for organization. One extreme is to govern all transactions via free market 
through spot-market or classical contracts for inputs supply and marketing. For example, 
leasing-in farmland and long-term material assets, purchasing all services for cultivation and 
harvesting of output, purchasing all short-term material assets, selling all primary products on 
market. Another extreme is a close internal organization such as one-person or group natural 
farm - farmer(s) employ only own resources (land, labor, technological knowledge) and 
consume whole product
5. Between these two polls there is a great arsenal ("spectrum") of 
feasible formal and informal modes for governing of each type of transactions: various sort of 
long-term contracts, association, cooperation, interlinked organization, diverse hybrid forms, 
firms of different kind (partnerships, corporations, complex hierarchical forms) etc.
6. 
Identification of practically employed specific forms for transactions in different countries is an 
object of a special micro-economic survey
7. 
                                                           
5 In one-person natural farm there are no transactions (any exchange of rights or products of 
specialised activity) taking place and therefore transaction costs are zero. However, extension of farm size 
and productivity are heavily restricted by owned agrarian resources and level of internal (e.g. family) 
consumption.   
6 For instance, a transaction associated with cultivation of land by a tractor can be governed in quite 
different ways: a farmer can buy (unified ownership), rent (rent contract) or lease a tractor (input and 
credit supply interlinked contract); farmer could buy cultivation service from market (contract service); 
number of farmers may buy a tractor (joint ownership) and to use it in a group (producers cooperative) or 
individually; farmer can join a cooperative providing cultivation services (non for profit organization); he 
may lease his land out to a tractor owner and share output (share tenancy contract); farmer can hire a 
tractorist to work on his farm (employment contract) and he may even sell cultivation service to market 
(profit making organization); cultivation service to farms could be subsidized by Government (trilateral 
mode), or provided by a municipality or state company (public organization) etc. 
7 Such attempts to identify and analyze dominant modes for land, and labor, and finance supply in 
Bulgarian farms have been made by Bachev (2002, 2003), and Bachev and Kagatsume.   7
  
"Measurement" of transaction costs 
 
One direction for evaluation of efficiency of agrarian organizations is the direct 
comparison of costs for each transaction in different forms. Organization which requires less 
costs for transacting is more efficient. For instance, comparison is made whether would be 
more economical direct (own) marketing of output or to use a marketing cooperative. 
Data for some part of transaction costs can be found in traditional statistics and 
accountancy (e.g. management costs, marketing costs). Another part of transaction costs may 
be easily specified - e.g. costs for licensing and notary registration, for agro-market 
information, for promotion and marketing of output, for general management, for hiring 
lawyers and court suits, for guarding property and yields, for payment of bribes etc. 
However, a significant portion of transaction costs is either very difficult (and too 
expensive) or impossible to be determined. In that group we can include the costs for finding 
best partners, for negotiation, for controlling and enforcement of contractual terms, for 
organizational development, for interlinked transacting, for unrealized (failed) deals etc. 
Besides, it is often extremely complicated to separate transaction costs from traditional 
production expenditures
8. For example, while executing farming operations a farmer supervises 
hired labor; during transportation of chemicals (by own track) he negotiates marketing of 
output by a mobile phone; expenditures for packaging, fans etc. also have both production and 
transaction character.  
Guess estimate for the level of transaction costs could be made by interviewing farm 
managers. Here it is essential to indicate the level (high, medium, low) of efforts and time 
devoted for governing of different type of transactions: for finding out needed labor for hiring, 
land and material inputs for purchase and lease-in etc.; for negotiation of terms of exchange; 
for monitoring implementation of contractual obligations; for current adaptation of contracts to 
emerging new conditions of exchange; for conflicts resolution; for memberships in professional 
organizations; for relationships with agrarian bureaucracy etc.  
Unfortunately the component comparison of transacting costs could not always give idea 
for the efficiency of organizations. Very often the alternative form decreases one type of costs 
while increasing another type of costs of transactions. For instance, internalization of a 
transaction (replacement of the market with an integral mode) is associated with reduction of 
costs for information supply (overcoming market uncertainty), for permanent (re) negotiations 
along with constantly changing conditions of trade, for safeguarding of investments from an 
outside opportunism etc. On the other hand it enlarges costs for organizational formation, for 
decision making, for integral management, for supervising and motivation of hired labor etc. In 
our previous example with alternatives for marketing of farm output the "internal realization" 
(personal consumption, production "consumption", processing etc.) could be chosen as more-
efficient form in comparison with the direct sell or use of marketing cooperative.  
Besides, a good part of transactions in transitional agriculture have been governed not by 
"pure" but through complex or interlinked modes - e.g. inputs supply in a "package" with 
know-how, extension or (and) service supply; joint supply of inputs and credit; crediting of 
production against marketing of output etc. Therefore, when we assess efficiency it is important 
                                                           
8 All these "measurement problems" make it impossible to extend the traditional Neoclassical 
models simply by adding a new "transacting" activity (Furuboth and Richter 1998, p.55).   8
to take into consideration overall (total) costs for organization of transactions of different types 
- thus all external and internal transaction costs of the farm.  
Furthermore, it is frequently very difficult to select a base for comparison at all in view of 
the fact that the high transacting costs entirely block development of an alternative 
organization. For instance, market for agrarian credit has recently started to emerge in Eastern 
Europe and for whole transitional period the internal supply (utilization of own finance, direct 
outside co-investment etc.) has been the only possible (single) form for finance supply of 
farms
9. Here the comparative level of transaction costs is impossible to be determined at all and 
hence to appreciate the "high" efficiency of the integral mode for finance supply. In that case 
funding with "own means" and with "bank credit" are not real alternative at all but completely 
different governing structures. Therefore, broadly applied traditional indicators for estimation 
of comparative efficiency of investments, based on "opportunity costs" (e.g. discounting, pay-
back period, internal rate of return etc.), and independent from the form of their funding, have 
no significant economic sense.  
 
Factors of transaction costs 
 
Another direction for evaluation of efficiency of different agrarian organizations is the 
discrete structural (institutional) analysis of alternative governing forms (Williamson, p.47). 
Since often it is either very difficult or impossible to determine transaction costs for individual 
mode, assessment is made on comparative costs of alternative organizations. Besides, the 
quantitative approach (absolute and relative measures, marginalism) is replaced by an 
qualitative (structural) analysis and indirect assessment of transacting costs. And that is very 
logical since individual governing structures differ from each other not in marginal but in 
qualitative "discrete structural way". Actually, we are interested not in absolute level of 
transaction costs in different form, but in organization with lowest costs for a particular 
transaction.  
Following this approach initially we have to identify critical factors of transactions in the 
specific institutional environment. These factors are responsible for variation of transacting 
costs and are associated with: behavioral characteristics of agrarian agents - bounded 
rationality, tendency for opportunism, reputation building, risk taking, level of trust, etc.; and 
with economic dimensions of individual transactions - frequency, uncertainty, assets 
specificity, and appropriability (Bachev 2000, Williamson).  
Transaction costs have two behavioral origins: individual’s bounded rationality and 
opportunism. Individual agrarian agents do not possess full information about the economic 
system (price ranges, demands, trade opportunities, trends of development) since collection and 
processing of such information would be either very expensive or impossible (e.g. for future 
events, for partners intention for cheating). In order to optimize decision-making they have to 
spent costs for "increasing their imperfect rationality" (for data collection, analysis, forecasting, 
training etc.).  
                                                           
9 Our large scale study of market oriented farms in Bulgaria has also proved that even presently 
only insignificant portion of them use bank credit for financing of their activities - accordingly 
19.8% for short-term and 11% for long-term financing (Bachev and Kagatsume).   9
Second factor is that economic agents are given to opportunism. Accordingly, if there is 
an opportunity for some of transacting sides to get non-punishably an extra rent from exchange 
he (or she) will likely do so
10. It is very costly or impossible to distinguish opportunistic from 
non-opportunistic behavior (because of bounded rationality). Therefore, agrarian agents have to 
protect their transactions from hazard of opportunism through: ex ante efforts to find a reliable 
counterpart and to design an efficient mode for partners credible commitments; and ex post 
investments for overcoming (through monitoring, controlling, stimulating cooperation) of 
possible opportunism during contract execution stage (Williamson, p.45). 
In addition to behavioral characteristics, transaction costs depend also on "critical 
dimensions" of each transaction. When recurrence of transactions between same partners is 
high, both sides are interested in working out a special form for standardization of their 
ongoing relationships (e.g. building an incentive structure, adjustment mechanisms, conflict 
resolution devices, etc). Continuation of relationships with a particular partner and designing a 
special mode for transacting has a high economic value. Parties restrain for opportunism which 
detection is "punished" by turning to a competitor (losing future business). Besides, costs for 
development of a special mode could be effectively recovered for repeated transactions. When 
a transaction is incidental then possibility for opportunism is great since cheating side can not 
be easily punished (building a reputation is not of value). Transaction costs become very high 
(and may block transacting) when low frequency coincides with high uncertainty and 
requirement for large relation-specific investments. 
When uncertainty which surrounds transactions increases then costs for overcoming this 
uncertainty go up (bounded rationality is crucial and opportunism can emerged). That is why 
agrarian agents will seek, develop, and use such modes of organization which diminish 
transaction uncertainty - internal integration, cooperation, rational (relational) contract etc. 
There are strong mutual incentives to develop a special form for repeated transacting when 
high uncertainty is combined with significant relation specific investments. When transacting 
between same counterparts is rare, and it is not supported by specific assets, and appropriability 
is high, then faceless (autonomous) market exchange is the most efficient mode. Depending on 
the levels of uncertainty and their risk aversion the agrarian agents will take different 
entrepreneurial risk and will get normal, low or extra than average rate of return from 
transactions.  
                                                           
10 Two major forms of opportunism can be distinguished: pre-contractual ("adverse selection") - 
when some of the partners use "information asymmetry" to negotiate better contract terms; and post-
contractual ("moral hazard") - when some counterpart takes an advantage of impossibility for full 
observation on his activities (by another partner or by a third party) or when he take "legal advantages" of 
unpredicted changes in transacting conditions (costs, prices etc.). Special third form of opportunism 
occurs in development of larger organizations. Here individual benefits are often not proportional to 
individual efforts, and everybody tends to expect others to invest costs for organizational development, 
and to benefit ("free riding") from the new organization. 
   10
Transaction costs are very high when some of the parties is to make specific for the 
transaction with a particular partner investments. In this case it is impossible to change a 
partner of transaction (alternative use of assets) without a big loss in value of specific capital
11. 
Specific investments are "locked" in relationships with the particular partner (personality of 
partner matters) and they cannot be returned back by "faceless" market transactions. Costless 
redeployment (alternative use) of specific assets is not possible if transactions fail to occur, 
they are prematurely terminated, or less favorable conditions of exchange are renegotiated (in 
contract renewal time and before the end of life-span of the specific capital). Therefore, if a 
transaction requires significant specific investments agrarian agents will have to design a 
special mode to safeguard their investments from expropriation (possible opportunism) - tied-
up contracts, quasi or complete integration etc.    
If symmetrical assets dependency (regime of bilateral trade) exists there are strong 
incentives in both parties to elaborate a special private mode of governance. However, when a 
unilateral dependency of investments exists then dependent side (facing a mini or total 
monopoly) has to protect investments against possible opportunism (behavioural uncertainty) 
either through integrating transactions (unified organization, joint ownership, cooperative)
12; or 
safeguarding them with some form of interlinked contract, exchange of economic hostages, 
development of an collective organization to outstand asymmetrical dependency (such as 
association for price negotiation, lobbying for Government regulations, etc).  
Serious transacting problems arise when condition of assets specificity is combined with 
high uncertainty and low frequency of transactions. In this case elaboration of a special 
governing structure for private transacting is not justified since set up costs can not be 
recovered by occasional transactions. Specific investments are not made and transactions fail to 
occur. Third party involvement (e.g. local authority, Government agency, non-governmental or 
hybrid organization) in individual transacting (through assistance, arbitration, regulation) is 
crucial for smooth organization of that type transaction. Special mode for trilateral transacting 
such as neoclassical contract has been invented to manage transactions with high uncertainty 
and asset specificity, and low frequency
13.  
Transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of product or services is low. In 
this case possibility for unwanted (unequal) market or private exchange is great
14. For 
transactions with low appropriability the costs and benefits are independent for individual 
participants. Because of bounded rationality the transaction costs for protection, detection, 
verification, and a third-party (e.g. court) punishment of unwanted exchange (non paying 
consumers-opportunists) are extremely high.  
                                                           
11 If investment in specific capital is not made, transactions either can not take place or it could 
occur without (or loss of) comparative advantages in respect of productivity.  
12 When technological opportunities for economy on scale (scope) on specific assets can be 
achieved. Otherwise integration of transactions will be lost-making comparing to outside price 
(production costs) competition. 
13 It governs relationships between partners and arranges a "third party participation" - e.g. 
determination of grades of wine, and identity of organic products by an authorized agency. 
14 "Natural" low appropriability has most of agrarian intellectual products: agro-market 
information, agro-meteorological forecasts, a big part of new agrarian technologies and varieties, software 
for agriculture etc. Besides, all products (and activities) with big positive or negative extetnalities (spill-
overs) are to be included in this group (Bachev and Labonne, p, 19).    11
If appropriability is low and transactions are strongly specific (for a particular customer) 
the only way to carry them out is to integrate transactions (in house production, trade secrets, 
etc.) or to elaborate an effective form for securing credible commitment (partners joint 
investments, interlinked transacting, etc). When recurrence of transactions between same 
parties is high (long-lasting partnership) then special forms for overcoming transacting 
difficulties has to be elaborated such as strategic alliances for innovation and marketing, joint 
ventures, etc. 
However, serious transaction difficulties occur (and may block transacting) when they 
require significant specific or universal investments but they are characterized with low 
frequency and high uncertainty. That is when pay-back on investment requires "mass" 
consumption and "collective appropriation" of benefits (and risk taking). Incidental character of 
transactions between same agents makes the designing costs for a private "collective supply 
organization" very high (opportunism of "free-riding" type). Therefore, a "third party" 
(Government) intervention in transactions is necessary in order to make them possible or more 
efficient (e.g. public organisation, state funding, introduction of mandatory fees, introduction 
and enforcement of new property right etc.). 
  
Discrete structural analysis  
 
Next major step is to evaluate the effective potential of alternative organizational mode: 
to minimize bounded rationality of agrarian agents and uncertainty surrounding transactions; 
for appropriation and protection of private investment from possible opportunism; to recover 
long-term costs for organizational development through high frequency of transaction between 
the same agents; to explore economy of size and scale on specific for transacting with a 
particular partner capital etc. Different governance forms are alternative but not equal modes 
for organization of transactions. They differ from one another in "discrete structural way" since 
they have different features to coordinate, control, and stimulate (in general to minimize costs 
on) transactions. Since different agrarian transactions have different "critical dimensions" and 
various governance forms have different comparative advantages operationalisation of the 
Transaction cost minimizing concept has been done by: "aligning transactions (which differ in 
their attributes) with governance structures (which differ in their costs and competence) in 
discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way" (Williamson, p.52). 
Limited (bounded) rationality of agrarian agents (lack of access to all information for 
optimal decision making, impossibility for "processing" of such information, deficiency of 
managerial experience etc.) increases transaction costs, and therefore there will be sleeked 
effective forms which diminish bounded rationality (investment for information supply, 
training, integration of transactions, using of special organization etc.). Possibility for 
opportunism of contragents (unwanted and non-punishable "exchange") also boosts transaction 
costs, and hence preferences would be given to forms restricting opportunistic behavior and 
protecting investment from unwanted expropriation (contract specification, using of economic 
hostages, join investment, ownership integration etc.). Built reputation (good or bed) and 
existence of trust between partners, reduce transaction costs making easier or blocking 
transactions. Finally, depending of their risk taking (high, low) the individual agents will have 
different transaction costs for investments connected with significant uncertainty.  
In general internal structure has advantage for governing of transaction with high 
uncertainty and specificity (dependency) of assets, since it diminishes bounded rationality and   12
protects investments from outside opportunism. Contrary, transactions with high certainty 
(bounded rationality is not of importance) and universal character of assets (opportunism can 
not be realized since transaction can be executed with another "faceless" partner without 
significant additional costs) can be carried across free market without encountering costs for 
development of a special private mode.  
Private organization is effective only for transactions with high recurrence between the 
same partners, since occasional (single) transactions do not give opportunity to recover ("pay-
back" on) investment for development of a special governance mode (mechanisms for 
coordination, stimulation, dispute resolution etc; formal registration etc.). 
Finally, markets and private forms are appropriate for transactions with high 
appropriability, since during the exchange they would entirely recover invested resources. For 
transaction with low appropriability the private rights on resources cannot be protected 
(unwanted exchange) or they are enforced with extremely high costs. Therefore, transactions 
with such features could be effectively governed either by a hybrid (mixed public-private, 




After specification of the potential of individual forms to minimize transaction costs of 
different type, we can build a principle scheme with generic types for governing of transactions 
with different critical dimensions (Table 1). For transactions with different combination of 
specific characteristics there would be suitable different effective forms for governing: part of 
agrarian transactions will be managed through free market exchange; another part will be 
organized through a special contract mode (s); part of transactions will be entirely internally 
integrated (firm), and another portion protected though a special private organization (s) 
outside of farm gates (cooperation, association). 
 
Table 1 Effective Modes for Governing of Agrarian Transactions 
 
Critical dimensions of agrarian transactions 
Appropriability 
High   Low 
Asset specificity 
Low High  High  Low 
Uncertainty 






High Low High Low  High  Low High Low High High 
M  ☺  ☺               
SC     ☺     ☺          H    PO 
IO         ☺    ☺      
TP      ☺       ☺    
 
M – free market; SC – special contract form; IO – internal organization; TP – necessity 
for a third-party involvement; H – hybrid mode; PO – public organization   13
 
 
 When transactions between same parties are occasional, but they are characterized with 
significant uncertainty, and they are with increasing or high specificity of assets, then there is no 
pure market or private mode for effective organization ("market failure", "contract failure"). 
Here a third part involvement (state, local authority, international assistance, private agent) is 
necessary to make such transactions more efficient or possible at all. 
 
Economic boundaries of agrarian organizations 
 
Lastly, for each generic mode the range (spectrum) of feasible organization forms is to be 
identified. For instance, variety of "internal organization" in agriculture includes: one-person 
farm or firm, family farm or firm, group farm or firm (partnership), cooperative, corporation, 
public farm or firm, joint venture etc. Corresponding forms of "free market" are: spot exchange 
on local, regional etc. markets; classical contract, wholesale trade etc. The "special contract 
form" could be: short-term contract, long-term contract, relational contract, interlinked 
organization, multilateral agreement etc. In order to complete the list of alternative governance 
modes in each generic type a special micro-economic survey is needed.   
Finally, we are (and able) to determine the effective (horizontal and vertical) boundaries of 
agrarian organizations of different type. Individual forms in each generic type should be 
evaluated for their potential to explore economy of scale (and size) of specialized or (and) 
specific capital, and comparative efficiency to minimize bounded rationality and to control the 
opportunism of participants
15. For instance, one-person farm (firm) has zero internal transaction 
costs (one agent), but limited possibility for investment in specialized (specific) human and 
material capital. «Internal» opportunities for increasing productivity (through investments, 
exploring economy of scale and size) increases along with the extension of members of the 
coalition (group farm) but that is also associated with an enlargement of internal costs for 
reducing (internal) bounded rationality and for controlling (internal) opportunism. The 
separation of ownership from management (cooperative, corporation) gives enormous 
(unlimited) opportunities for productivity growth but it is connected with huge transacting costs 
(for decreasing information asymmetry between management and shareholders, for decision 
making, for controlling opportunism of hired labor and between partners etc.). The special 
contract form combines the potential for a greater "control" on transactions with possibility to 
explore advantages of further specialization of activity. The boundaries of agrarian markets 
extend along with development of specialization and standardization of agrarian recourses, 
technologies, and products, and institutional conditions for protecting of private (absolute and 
contract) rights. 
                                                           
15 Such an attempt to determine the economic boundaries of different type of farms in transitional 
Bulgarian conditions has been done in our previous publication (Bachev and Tsuji 2001b).   14
  Thus that is a question of trade-off (comparison of benefits) between the increase in 
productivity and the growth of transacting costs, and of minimization of overall (production plus 
transaction) costs of farm. Such comparison not always (most often) is quantitatively measured 
having in mind problems associated with "measurement of transaction costs"
16. However, that 
calculation is always made by business managers and by all (rational) economic agents. 
Economic science should not ignore "immeasurable" costs of transaction but to seek adequate 
forms for their incorporation into efficiency analysis.  
At this stage of analysis it becomes clear the inadequacy of suggested indicators for 
productivity of production costs and resources for estimation of efficiency of the different 
organizations. The opposite is true  - it has to be expected a significant difference in the rate of 
profitability on investments in an agro-firm ("profit making organization") from the "pay-back" 
of expenditures and resources in a cooperative ("member oriented organization"), a public farm 
("non-for profit organization") or in a self-consistent farm (giving opportunity for productive use 
of otherwise "non-tradable" resources such as family labor, land etc.).    
Traditional statistical and other data are little suitable to test and broadly apply our new 
approach. Here they are necessary micro-economic data for different transactions governed by 
various types of farms. For this purpose it has to be organized interviews with managers of 
different kind of farms. Questions should give information for the specific characteristics of 
transactions of particular type and for the level of transacting costs. Besides direct indicators (for 
instance "frequency of deals with the same partner", "term of contract" etc.) it should be also 
used appropriate proxy (indirect) indicators for expression of uncertainty of transactions, 
specificity and dependency of assets, etc. For instance, such indicators could be: "whether there 
is an alternative supplier (buyer)"; "reason for selecting a particular supplier or buyer (the best 
price, delayed payments, receiving supplementary service etc.)"; "identity of the partner 
(relative, friend, member organization etc.)"; "factors which make difficult the procurement or 
sell (finding a partner, high price level, non-fulfillment of negotiated terms)" etc.    
The goal of such analysis is not only to check (test) adequacy of the suggested approach 
for economic evaluation of agrarian organizations, but also to identify transaction difficulties, 




In unreal economy "without transaction costs" the theory of agrarian organization is very 
simple - there are no agrarian organizations (farms, firms, cooperative etc.). Here the single 
mechanism for governing (organizing, coordinating) all economic activities is the free market. 
"Situation of efficiency" is easily achieved since agrarian agents (individuals, households, firms) 
automatically and costlessly adapt their behavior according to movements of market prices and 
changes in production technologies. 
In the real agrarian economy "with transaction costs" there is also place for other effective 
(non market) modes for optimization of resource use - group farms, cooperatives, a big variety of 
contract forms, public firms, hybrid and mix forms. "The old" problem of efficiency founds a 
"new" dimension through incorporation into analysis of the costs of transacting (in addition to 
                                                           
16 Moreover, the traditional production costs are also not always easily accounted as a result of 
"deformation" of market prices. That is why in calculations of efficiency is suggested to be used 
"average", "index", "shadow", "discounted" etc. prices.   15
the traditional production expenditures). Moreover, accent is put on evaluation of comparative 
efficiency of all (rather then only a part) of alternative modes for organization of agrarian 
transactions - "free market" as one extreme and "natural farm" or/and "complete (public or 
private) hierarchy" as another poll(s). It also becomes absurd both the usage of traditional 
approaches of "black box" in analysis of governing structures and of productivity as an indicator 
for efficiency of different agrarian organizations. 
That new concept of efficiency is an inseparable part of the new understanding of the 
essence and economic role of agrarian organizations. However, transaction costs economizing is 
not only a modern academic concept but a real practice in the world we are living in. Here 
arguments such as "transaction costs are difficult to measure"" and therefore "they will be 
ignored in assessment of efficiency" are not acceptable - not only in research works, but (mostly) 
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